Research

Dissertation project

Paying for Climate Change: The Politics of Insurance in a Warming World Committee: Kathleen Thelen (chair), Devin Caughey, Evan Lieberman, Leah C. Stokes (UC Santa Barbara)

Working papers

Ethnicity and Climate Dissensus in Africa (with Devin Caughey and Evan Lieberman)

The African continent has already experienced severe climate impacts, yet public attitudes toward climate change vary widely within and across countries. Drawing on Afrobarometer surveys from 29 countries, we test whether opinions are divided along ethnic lines. We find evidence of ethnic dissensus in nearly every country, strongest in perceptions of climate hazards but also present in views on policy responses. Using Bayesian multilevel models, we assess three explanations: individual composition of groups, group-level attributes, and geographic context. We find the strongest evidence for the third explanation, specifically that dissensus is greatest where ethnic groups are more regionally segregated. Additionally, wealthier groups tend to be more aware of climate issues yet less concerned about action, though inequality itself does not predict dissensus. These findings underscore the links between ethnicity, regionalism, and climate politics, contributing to research on ethnic politics, public goods provision, and the emerging field of climate-related attitudes. (Draft available upon request)

The Electoral Effects of Private Sector Positions: Evidence from the US House

Does actively holding an outside private sector position benefit the political careers of politicians? I investigate this question in the context of candidates running for the House in the period 2004-2018. I define a private sector position (PSP) as a politician holding an executive, ownership, or director position at a firm while running for office. I acquire data on House members’ outside positions and create a new dataset of challenger candidates’ outside positions by digitizing their financial disclosure documents. I argue that PSPs may provide electoral resources to politicians, including in the form of campaign finance and politically influenced business decisions. I then estimate whether PSPs are associated with higher election returns and examine how the effect differs across party and incumbency status. I find that PSPs are associated with a significant electoral advantage, with the effect highest for challenger candidates and Republicans. I investigate two potential mechanisms to explain this result: campaign finance and expansionary behavior around election cycles. I find that candidates with PSPs receive more total contributions, contributions from committees, and individual donations. Linking firms declared on candidates’ financial disclosures to panel data on firm characteristics, I find some evidence that firms connected to incumbents hire more during election years relative to challenger-connected and unconnected firms. This suggests that incumbent-connected firms engage in behavior analogous to political business cycles. These results contribute to a growing literature showing politicians with corporate connections can advance their political careers by extracting costly favors from firms. (Draft available upon request)


Works in progress

Pulling the Fire Alarm? Insurer corporate political behavior on climate change

Ideology and Individual-level Climate Adaptation in Brazil (with Clemente T. Sanchez)

Premium Politics: Home insurance, electoral accountability, and climate adaptation